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I N  DEFENCE OF T H E  HYPOTHETICAL IMPE RATIVE * 
by 
PHILIPPA FOOT 
A Consideration of Kant's arguments against the hypothetical imperative in 
morality. 
In this paper I want to consider Kant's reasons for rejecting the hypothetical 
imperative as a form of moral judgement. As everyone knows, Kant insisted that 
moral precepts must be 'categorical imperatives' telling the agent what he should 
do whatever his desires or interests. These categorical imperatives Kant contrasted 
with rules or skill on the one hand and rules of prudence on the other, calling both 
hypothetical imperatives. Unlike a categorical imperative a hypothetical im­
perative operates only on Lhe condition of certain desires or interests, as when e.g. 
tlhe agent wishes to bisect a line and should lake ruler and compasses, or when he is 
told what he should do for the sake of his happiness. That moral precepts cannot be 
hypothetical imperatives is the most basic tenet of Kant's moral philosophy, and it 
is accepted by many who, rejecting entirely his attempts co derive moral 
judgements from 1he mere form of law expressed in terms of a universally 
legislative will. would not dream of calling themselves Kantians in ethics. Where 
these non-Kantians nevertheless agree with Kant is in the convictfon that a moral 
system cannot consist of a set of hypothetical imperatives telling the agent what be 
should do, or ought to do, only on condition of hjs having certain desires, or of 
certain things being to his advantage. 
Jt is, I believe, a mistake to think that Kant has disposed of the hypothetical 
imperative. and I wish to consider Lhe arguments that he brought against it. It will, 
perhaps. make things clearer if I explain what it is that I am ready to defend, so I 
shall first ask what is to be understood by a system of morality involving only 
hypothetical imperatives. What, indeed, is a hypothetical imperative? 
At the outset we should distinguish two different interpretations of the ex· 
pression 'hypothetical imperative', one having to do with the conditions of use of 
the word 'should', and other related terms such as 'ought', and the other having to 
do with practical reasoning. 
Let us consider the first. When it is said that a certain agent 'should' do a par· 
ticular thing (let us say that he should '1J ) the 'should' may, so far as our present 
usage goes. operate in two different ways, which we may call hypothetical and non­
hypothetical. When we use 'should' 'hypothetically' we are saying what should be 
done by a man given that he bas particular desires or interests, and our use of 
'should' depends on such contingent factors. We are, perhaps. advising him, and w e  
say what he should do on the assumption that he wants e.g. to get a particular job or 
marry a particular girl, where the action is ancillary to the supposed end. If, 
however, he tells us that we are mistaken. which might or might not be on account 
o! his having rel\nquished the project, we have to take back what we said; our 
·should' stands unsupported and in need of support. Similarly, if we say what a man 
should do for the sake of his happiness, and it appears that his interest does not lie 
where we 1hought ii did, we must again withdraw our 'shou ld' or find other ways of 
backing it. In both cases the use of 'should' is hypothetical, in the sense that it 
• All future publication rights reserved by the author. 
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presupposes certain desires or interests. telling what should be done only on 
assumptions of this kind. In our language. this 'hypothtticar or conditional use of 
'should' is the one most Crequen1ly found. and it can plausibly be argued that it is 
alway!> present where advice is being given.1 That we also have a different use of 
·�hould' is ne' ertheless not to be denied. and we may freely grant that in moral 
contexts 'should', 'ought', aod so on, are used in this second 'non-hypothetical' way. 
For in such contexts. where a moral ground is suggested as the reason why 
something should be done. we may say that a man should � without the im­
plicatio111 that Sil ·ing stands in an ancillary relation to his desires or interests. We 
may, of course. think that it does stand in such relation, as when e.g. we suppose 
thnt othit!rs care about moral ends such as the relief of suffering. If. however. it 
turns out that this is not the case, and perhaps we never even thought that it was, 
the 'should' does not stand 'unsupported and in need of support'. The moral 'should' 
- let us call it 'shouldm ' -is adequately supported if 1he right kind of thing can be 
shown about the nature of th.e action. as e.g. that it deprives �onocent people of life 
or liberty. and this without the special circumstances which might justify even that. 
Whal is not necessary is that we should show a connexion with the agen1's desires 
or interests if we are correctly lo maintain our use of 'should': so that we have here 
a ·non-hypo1hetical' use of the word. Whether such 'non·hypo1hetical' usage is 
found only in moral contexts 1 would doubt. We seem lO find it also e.g. in the 
cnnunciation of club rules or rules of etiquette. a e.g. 'Ladies should not be 
brought into Lhe smoking room' or 'Invitations in the third person should be an· 
�wered �n the third person'. If Lhe club secretary says to a member 'You should not 
bring ladies into the smoking room' be does not have to withdraw what he said, as 
not applying to this member. on finding that he is resigning tomorrow and wiU be 
delighted 10 be reputed an iconoclast. Nor do the rules of etjquette fail to apply to 
one who sensibly decides co ignore them. These examples suggest that i1 would be 
difficult LO base very much on the fact of a non-hypothetical use of 'should' in any 
context. and one of the points I want to mak� is that its importance could easily be 
overestimated in ethics. I would like to suggest that the non-hypothetical use of 
'should' is not very important, and that it is certainly far from giving us a categorical 
imperative in !he Kantian sense. Nobody is going to argue thait the rules of etiquette 
<>r club rules are Kantian categorical imperatives. 
1 shaEI now turn Lo the second interpretation of the expression 'hypo1lhetical 
imperative' mentioned at the beginning of the paper. Whether or not a man em· 
ploys hypothetical imperatives understood in this sense depends on lhe form of his 
practical reasoning; 1ba1 is (as I am understanding it here) the grounds on which he 
is prepared to argue to conclusions expressing a practical decision such as TU do it' 
I shall say that a man takes sentences with 'should' or 'ough t' as hypothetical im· 
peratives in this second sense. so long as he argues 'So I'll " '  only when §!) -ing is 
!!>hO\t n as ancillary to something that he wants, or which it is in his interest to have. 
He is told, for instance. that he should ool steal, although he could get away with 
c;cealing. He asks why h.e should not steal. and the other. unless he believes in a pure 
intuiuon about stealing. says something about che role or security of property in the 
life of the community, pointing out how much worse off people are when they must 
keep a constant guard on their possessions. The normal assumption is that the 
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agent cares about how people in general fare in the community, and if he does 
honesty over property will have been related 10 the ends that he has. But if he does 
not care about such ends of morality as the general good he will, if acting only on 
hypothetical imperatives. say that he has no reason to refrain from stealing. He will 
not take the fact that he shouldm not steal as itself any reason for not stealing, any 
more than many of us take the fact that invitations in the third person should e 
(should from the point of view of etiquette) be answered in the same person as itself 
any reason for answering it thus. The 'should' in the rule of etiquette is treated by us 
as a hypothetical imperative in our second sense. 
Jn the case of etiquette or club rules it is obvious that the non-hypothetical use of 
'should' has resulted in the loss of the usual connexion between what one should do 
and what one has reason to do. Someone who objects that in the moral case a man 
cannot be justified in restricting his practical reasoning in this way, since every 
moral 'should' gives reasons for acting. must face the following dilemma. Either it is 
possible to create reasons for acting simply by putting together any silly rules and 
introducing a non-hypothetical 'should'. or else the non-hypothetical 'should' does 
:not necessarily imply reasons for acting. If it does not necessarily imply reasons for 
acting we may ask why it is supposed to do so in the case of morality. Why cannot 
the indifferent amoral man say that for him 'sbouldm ' gives no reason for acting, 
treating 'shouldm · as most of us treat 'should e '? Those who insist that 'should m ' is 
categorical in this second ·reason giving' sense do not seem to realise that they 
never prove this lo be so. They sometimes say that moral considerations 'just do' 
give reasons for acting, without explaining why some devotee of etiquette could not 
say the same about the rules of etiquette. 
We have now distinguished two senses in which a moral system might be said to 
contain only hypothetical imperatives. First we would have such a system if the 
moral 'should' appLied only in case the right connexion could be found with the 
agent's interests or desires. This is not, as we agreed, our actual usage, but that it is 
not seems to me to be quite unimportant. I believe that we could change to a 
hypothetical use of 'should' io moral contexts without destroying or even disrupting 
morality. To see how the word would then be used we may look to things as they 
are now in some other contexts. For instance, we may consider a group of people 
taking for granted a common allegience to particular ends, but recognising that 
others outside the group do not necessarily want the same things. (We might think 
of some organized group such as a college or a team, or simply of a band of people 
who share certain aims, such as e :g. the prevention of war, or the preservation of 
the environment. They might even have very limited aims, such as preventing a 
crime. or robbing a bank.) Speaking within the group about the actions of members 
of the group they say that certain things should be done. Since the common aims 
are taken for granted it is not necessary to keep repeating 'because we want . .  .' 
Nevertheless the 'should' is used hypothetically, since it is not used in connexion 
with those outside the group who are not supposed to have these things at heart. 
We do noL say e.g. that a certain shopkeeper should move his premises because his 
business gets in the way of our projects, though we do say that we should see if we 
can induce him lo do so. It would be like this \vith the moral 'should' if our moral 
system contained hypothetical imperatives in the first sense, and I want to say that 
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it '' ould not matter at au if we made this change in our usage. We should have lost 
nothing. except one among our many instruments for expressing a hostile attitude 
to persons outside the moral group. (We would no longer be able to say that they 
shoufdn 't act as they do.) 
In the second sense a moral system contains only hypothetical imperatives in so 
far as moral considerations are considered to be reasons for acting only when 
related to the desires or interests of the agent. Kant thought that a man who acted 
only on such principles could not be a moral man, but thiis too 1 want to deny. I 
believe he could have moral principles and possess every virtue. 
T am, of course, aware that this will seem an extraordinary suggestion. "How" it 
will be asked "can it possibly be thought that one who pursues only his own ends 
may yet have moral principles and be a man of moral virtue?" To answer, we must 
ask how our opponent is understanding the expression "pursuing his own ends"? If, 
as would be natural, he means "pursuing hL'> own advantage" we should agree that 
�uch a man would not come under our description of a moral man. With this in· 
terpreiation, however, we have gone beyond our original hypothesis, which was 
express·ed in terms of a man's desires as weU as his interests. "What a man desires" 
was taken quite generally to cover "what he wants", leaving scope £or any desires 
however allruistic. A man may want, and want more than anything in the world, lo 
help other people; and his hypothetical imperatives will then relate to such ends. 
Such a man would be one who could have the virtue of charity, in spite of the fact 
that his reasoning to a practical conclusion was always dependent on the con· 
tingent fact of his desires. How this would work out in the case of virtues such as 
honesty, and other forms of justice (in the wide traditional sense). is more 
problematic, since these virtues are not defined by their relation to a n  end. In 
saying that a man using only desire-dependent practical reasoning could have the 
virtue of honesty or justice I am thinking that he might believe that rules of honesty 
and justice were important for the common good and the protection of the weak, 
about which he cared. Moreover he wanted to live openly and in good faith \vith his 
neighbours, and therefore rejected dishonesty and injustice even where it seemed 
possible to conceal these things and nullify their bad effects. 
Something should be said at this point about i11cli11atio11. I have not been talking 
about practical reasoning related to a man's inclination but to the things that he 
wants. To get what one wants one has to go against inclination unless one's wants 
are very limited indeed; for instance if one wants to be a decent philosopher one 
has to overcome one's disinclination to get up in the morning and do some work. 
and it is with practical reasoning geared 10 such aims that moral practical reasoning 
would have 10 be compared. A morality of inclination would not get off the ground. 
I apologise for so long a preamble to a paper that is meant to be about IK.ant, but 
it seemed to be essential to give some idea of the moral system I had in mind before 
asking whether Kant bad brought any valid arguments against it. Let me now 
address myself to this problem. Kant believed that it was impossible to combine the 
concept of morality with that of the hypothetical imperative, implying that it was 
not the uninteresting matter of usage as I have represented it that leads to the non· 
hypot hetical 'should' in moral contexts. and saying explicitly that one whose 
practical reason ing was of the form just described would be lacking the good will of 
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lh� lruly moral man. As one who disagrees about this I must of course consider the 
various arguments given by Kant, and I have taken this opportunity, when I have 
1he good forlune to be able to consult Professor Beck's judgement on the matter, to 
reconsider Kant's moral writings from this point of view, using the Lectures on 
Ethics, the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, the Critique of Practical 
Reason. and the Metaphysics of Morals. 
Kant's objections lo the hypothetical imperative as the form of moral judgement 
apparenily fall into two groups, of which the second is much more important than 
1he first. On the one hand he argues that the actions of one guiding his conduct 
!ntirely by hypothetical imperatives would be at best contingently in conformity 
with morality, that is with such things as charity and honesty. On the other be 
argues that the status of moral principles could not be secured under such a system. 
They would become merely contingent, lack universal validity or objective 
necessity, and fail to be the object of respect. 
Kant's first argument seems to me 10 depend on his faulty theory of human 
action. What he believes is that there can be either material or formal motives of 
action. A man may do something either because he has a desire for some object and 
makes this thing his end (a material motive), or else because he does it for the sake 
of the moral law, when the motive is formal. In the latter case a feeling of respect 
does, indeed, arise in him, but without being the prior condition of the action. Now 
r am not attacking Kant because I have some Humean view of tine possible gen esis 
of human action, and I theliefore propose to agree that a man may do something 
because he teHs himself, or is convinced by Kant, that only thus wiJI he be acting in 
conformity with reason, in adopting a maxim which could serve the universaUy 
legislative will. It is with che other side of Kant's theory of human action that I ,  like 
many others, and like Professor Beck himse!I, must quarrel. For Kant thought that 
when not acting out of respect for the moral Jaw a man always followed egotistical 
or hedonistic desires. He is, in face, a psychological hedonist, in respect of those 
actions dictated by hypothetical imperatives. Thus in the Critique of Pure Reason 
(translated L. W. Beck. p. 133) he says ''All material practical principles are, as 
such, o f  one and the same kind and belong under the general principle of self-love 
or one's own happiness", while in the Metaphysics of Morals Part II. Introduction, 
Section Il. he says that ethics cannot start from the ends which a man may propose 
to himself, since these are all "selfish". And in the early Lectures 011 Ethics he had 
given the maxim "If it harms thee to lie do not lie" as the principle of truth telling 
under a system of hypothetical imperatives. (There are many other examples of this 
sort in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.) 
It has been pointed out by Professor Beck (Introduction to Immanuel Kant: 
Critique of Practical Reason) that Kant's admittedly faulty theory of human action 
motivated by desire is not essential Lo his theory of ethics, and one must agree that 
in refuting the former one does not refute the latter. Nevertheless the faulty theory 
is essential to one of Kant's arguments against the possibility of a moral system 
containing only hypothetical imperatives. Given the premise assumed by Kant the 
point would indeed have been proved. For even if we allow, as Kant does in some 
place, that the pleasure or satisfaction to which desire determined action is 
directed may be of the most refined and altruistic kind it is impossible to make a 
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syslem of psychological hedonism consistent with morality. If it really were true 
that in every case of doing A because one wanted B, what was wanted was more 
pleasure or less pain. no one would e.g. submit to torture rather than betray his 
friends, and a man whose desire was always a desire for pleasure or the avoidance 
of pain would certainly not possess the moral virtues if he acted on hypothetical 
imperatives related to these ends. If, however, we abandon these theories of human 
action, which we are in no position to support, and allow as ends the things that 
seem to be ends, induding such things as the good of others. why should we deny 
virtue to one whose desires are in conformity wilh virtue not contingently but as 
directed lo the ends internal to the virtue concerned? There is all the difference in 
the world between wanting another person's happiness for the sake of one's own 
and simply wanting �t. Similarly there is all the difference between wanting to be 
honest because honesty is the best policy and wanting it on account of the im­
portance of honesty in the life of the community of which one is a part, and because 
of one's concern for the common good. Kant's argument that a system of 
hypothetical imperatives would produce at most a contingent conformity to 
morality seems to depend wholly on a theory of human nature which prevented him 
from considering just that set of ends which would give true virtue rather than 
accidental conformity. I want, therefore, to dismiss this particular set of arguments 
as depending on a false premise. 
Let us turn, then, lo the second and more central argument, which is about the 
status that moral rules would have under a system of hypothetical imperatives, and 
the status they must have in order to be moral rules. Kant admits that in 
hypothetical imperatives we do indeed have necessary principles, since they tell us 
whal must be done in order to achieve our ends. But since the end is one that the 
subject may or may not have (a contingent end) the necessity is a merely sub­
jective, conditional necessity. This I would accept. It seems to me that there is no 
way of going behind the last end given in the chain of reasons for doing an action. 
Whereas Kant, however much he does, in places, allow for moral ends, such as the 
altruistic end, insists that the adoption of the end is itself something dictated by 
reason .  So he says, in the Metaphysics of Morals, (Part II section 30)" . . .  
beneficence is the maxim to make the happiness of others an end for oneseU, and 
the duty of beneficence involves the subject's being constrained by his reason to 
adopt this maxim as a universal law". That there are moral ends he agrees, but 
insists that the end is one lhal the agent has a duty to adopt. I know that in denying 
this I am saying something that will seem paradoxical to most people. My own view 
is that while there are ends within ethics which one shouldm adopt (as e.g. that 
one's children get a good education) there are others which rather define morality. 
And just as there are difficulties about saying that one 'ought' to be moral, so there 
are difficulties about saying that one 'ought' to take account of the general good. 
For either the 'ought' means 'morally ought' or 'ought from a moral point of view' or 
else it does not. II it does we have a tautological principle. If it does not the 
problem is to know what is being said. By hypothesis a prudential 'ought' is not 
intended here. or one related to others of the agent's contingent ends. Nor do we 
have the 'ought' and 'ought not' operating with the system of etiquette, or some 
system of institutional rules. This 'ought' - the one in the sentence 'One ought to 
be moral' - is supposed to be free floating and unsubscripted, and I have never 
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found any()ne '"'ho could explain the use of the word in such a context. (They are 
apt to talk about the expressing of resolves, or of decisions, but it is then not clear 
\\hy \\C need the 'ought' terminology when 'I resohe' and T"e decided' are already 
in use.) My own conclusion is that 'One ought to be moral' makes no sense at aJI 
unle\� the 'ought' ha� the moral subscript. giving a tautology. or else relates 
morality to ome other system such as prudence or etiquette. I am, therefore 
put ting forward quite seriously a theory that disallows the possibility of saying that 
a man ought (free unsubscripted 'ought') to have ends other than those he does 
have: e.g. that the uncaring. amoral man ought to care about the relief of suffering 
or the protection of the weak. In my view we must start from the fact that some 
people do care about such things, and even devote their lives to them; they may 
lhercfore talk about what should be done presupposing such common aims. These 
things are necessary, but only subjectively and condi1ionally necessary, as Kant 
would put it. 
Kunt '' ould of course object that I am treating men as if. in the army of duty, 
they were volunteers, and this is exactly my thought. Why does Kant so object to 
the idea that th(.)se " ho are concerned about moralit y  are joining together with like 
minded people to fight against injustice and oppression. or to try to relieve suf· 
fcnng, and that they do <;O because, caring about such things. they are ready to 
H>luntecr in the cauc;e? Kant says that there is a kind of conceit inYolved in such a 
conception. Wh}' does he think this? He supposes that in so \ iewing the matter (in 
\ceing our-;eh cs as 'olunteers) we are forgetting our nature as human beings, 
member. of the phenomenal as well as the ooumenal world. whose will may be 
dcterminc::d by the moral law but also by desire. so that we do not automatically act 
a.-. a being wnh a holy "'ill would act, and are beings for whom the dictates of reason 
take the form 0£ a command. Let us agree that a human being does not necessarily 
haH! moral ends, and that even when he does his inclination may be stronger than 
his moral resolves. Both of these things being crue a man could be mistaken either 
in c;uppo<;ing lhnt his concern for others could not fail, or in supposing that by 
merely following his inclinat ions he could serve moral causes wi th no need for 
rcsolu1ion or <;elf discipline. We have already pointed out that a morality of 
hypothcticnl im peratives is nol a morality of inclination: resolution and self 
discipline being at least as necessary to achieve moral ends as to achieve anything 
che. So let ui. coni.idcr the other suggestion. that the supporter of the hypothetical 
imperathc i\ ra;ting to recognise that the desires of e'en the most moral of men 
could ah"aYl> c hange. This charge should be denied. One who supports the 
hypothetic.ii im pcrati"e does not forget that desires might change: he has simply 
ghen up trying to deal. in advance, with such a contingency by saying to himself 
that he:: would st ill be under command. That this seems hard to accepl is the fact 
1ha1 lie\, I think. al the heart of Kantianism in ethics, and to the neo-Kantianism of 
tho\e " ho ac�ept hi� trictures on the hypothetical imperathe though re1ecting the 
r�st of his theory. It will o;eem to many impossible that one should have nothing to 
i.ay about 1he case where moral concerns ha\e ' anished. except of course, to note 
the character of the man concerned, and in the case of other people. to take what 
mca.,urcs ()ne can to stop them from doing harm. Perhaps the greatest fear is of a 
change in on.:i.elr: one wants as it were to make sure one is stuck with the idea of 
acting morally wha1evcr one 's concerns have become. The move betrays a lack of 
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confidence which oddly does not so often trouble people when their devotion is to 
causes other than those or morality. So far as f know the people of Leningrad were 
not troubled, during the terrible years 0£ siege, by the thought that their allegiance 
to the city was only contingent, or that they were dependent on the likewise 
continge111t devotion of the other citizens. Perhaps one should be less troubled than 
one is by fear of defection from the moral cause; perhaps one would even have less 
rt!ason to fear it, if the army of duty were thought of as an army or volunteers. For 
many people feel uneasy about the things that are said about the authority and 
binding force of morality, fearing, like Thraisymachus, that they may be being 
tricked. In my view their scepticism is well grounded, since I believe that many of 
the statements with which people would bolster the 'authority' of 'the moral law' 
arc in fact meaningless, unless viewed as expressions of the feeling that we have 
about morality. As stating what we tend to feel they make sense: taken in any other 
way they do not. 
These suggestions are, of course, directly relevant to Kant's arguments against 
the hypothetical imperative, for the same problems arise about the meaning of the 
things that he says. What, for instance, does it mean to say that moral rules are 
categorical commands? In the first place they are not commands at all. neither 
commands of men nor commands of God; or rather if they are commands of God it 
is not as commanded by God that they are in Kant's sense categorical commands. 
<Thi<; he says explicitly.) What we actually have are rules of conduct adopted by 
certain societies. and individuals within these societies: and Kant is saying that 
these rules are unh·ersally valid. But when we put it this way, in terms of rules, the 
difficulty of understanding Lhe notion of universal validity is apparent. {lt can no 
longer mean that everyone is commanded, which shows that there is some point in 
denying Kant the picturesque language of commands.) Kant's thought seems to be 
that moral rules are universally valid in that they are inescapable, that no one can 
contract out of morality, and above all chat no one can say that as he does not 
happen to care about the ends of morality, morality does not apply to him. This 
thought about ioescapability is very important. and we should pause to consider it. 
11 is perhaps Kant's most compelling argument against the hypothetical imperative, 
and 1he one lhat may make Kantians of us all. 
There is. of course, a sense in which morality is inescapable. Consider, for in­
stance, moral epithets such as 'dishonest', 'unjust', 'uncharitable'; these do not 
cease to apply to a man because he is indifferent to the ends of morality: they may 
indeed apply to him because of his indirf erence. He is judged by the criteria of 
morality when moral character is in question, and Kant is indeed right in saying 
1ha1 these criteria are independent of his desires. (Contrast a word such as 'rash'). 
No one can escape the application of the moral terms by pleading his indifference. 
Nor can he escape them by turning to ways of life in which he can be counted as 
being neither morally good nor morally bad, as he can escape being a good or a bad 
husband by simply not marrying, or a good or bad carpenter by refusing to take up 
the tools. In this sense, then. morality is inescapable. but this can be accepted, and 
insisted on. by Kant's opponent, the defender of the hypothetical imperative. The 
laner may also agree that the application or such epithets will often be the vehicle 
for the expression of opposition, disgust or hatred. h had already been agreed that 
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with our present 'non-hypothetical' use of 'should' in moral contexts the application 
of the moral 'should' is also inescapable. But someone who thinks that significant 
concessions have now been made to Kant must answer the following question. Has 
anything been said about the inescapability of morality which could not also be said 
about the ioescapability of etiquette? For just as a man is immoral if he does certain 
things. despite his indifference to the nature and result of his actions. so he is rude 
or unmannerly, or one who does what is 'not done'. whatever his views about 
etiquette. Since no one says that the rules of etiquette are categorical imperatives 
the task must be to explain rhe additional inescapability belonging to morality. 
We must return, therefore, to the difficuhy of discovering what Kant can have 
meant by saying that moral rules have objective necessity. are categorical com­
mands. are universally valid, or are binding upon the will of every free agent. 
Nothing that we have yet considered has given Kant what he wants. and one 
cannot. I think, avoid the following conclusion. Kant's argument that moral rules 
have a peculiar and dignified status depends wholly upon his attempt to Link moral 
action with rationality through the mere concept of the form of law and the 
principle of universalisability, as interpreted by him. In acting morally Kant thinks 
that we do as reason dictates. In acting immoraJly we are acting irrationally, and if 
this is not how Kant puts it. it is what he must show in order to make his point. II it 
could be proved, then any man. whatever his desires, could be shown to have 
reason to act morally. since one has reason to do what it is rational to· do. The 
difficulty. as everyone knows, is to accept Kant's arguments purporting to show 
that morally bad actions are those whose maxim could not belong to a universally 
legislative will. and moreover that action according to such maxims is irrational 
action. These difficulties have been argued ad nauseam. and I shall not repeat the 
arguments here. All I would claim to have shown is that no one who rejects Kant's 
attempts to derive morality from reason has been given any reason to reject the 
hypothetical imperative in morals. h is commonly believed that even if Kant has 
not shown the connexion between reason and morality he has at least destroyed the 
hypothetical imperative. I have urged that, on the contrary, there is no valid 
argument against the hypothetical imperative to be found in Kant should the 
argument from reason fail. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. This would imply lhal moral ADVICE can be given only 10 one inreresled in moralily. 1 believe this to be 
correct, but ii 1s not essential to my thesis. 
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